
In today’s post, I am following up on the theme of complexity by drawing upon ideas from Derrida to further explore these concepts. I will start with a fundamental question regarding the basic premise- Is complexity an inherent property of a situation, independent of the observer, or does it emerge through observation and purpose? In other words, is complexity a given phenomenon in the external world or is it constructed?
This question might seem strange to some, while straightforward to others. Some might argue that this leads us down the path of solipsism, while others might contend that this approach is superior as it pushes us away from naive realism. In this article, we will examine the perspective where complexity manifests as an observer-dependent phenomenon, shaped by intention, purpose, and the limitations of presence. Through Derrida’s philosophical framework, we will explore how complexity emerges not as an absolute property, but as a relational phenomenon tied to observer intention and capability.
When we discuss observer-independent properties, we generally refer to physical properties of a situation that are ‘objective’. Consider the example of a termite hill. The material composition, number of tunnels, number of intersections, and other dimensional properties are indeed independent of the observer. However, I would posit that complexity is fundamentally different, and this difference can be demonstrated through three levels of analysis.
First, at the ontological level, complexity emerges as a second-order property. While first-order properties like mass, dimension, or quantity exist independently, complexity arises from the relationships between these properties. These relationships do not exist in isolation but are perceived and constructed through an observer’s cognitive framework. For instance, in our termite hill example, the mere presence of multiple tunnels does not inherently create complexity – it is the observer’s attempt to understand their interconnections, purpose, and evolutionary significance that generates the perception of complexity.
Second, at the epistemological level, complexity manifests through the limitations and capabilities of the observer. Consider two observers of the same termite hill: an entomologist and a child. The entomologist might find the structure’s organization relatively straightforward due to their understanding of termite behavior and construction patterns. The child, lacking this specialized knowledge, might perceive the same structure as overwhelmingly complex. This demonstrates that complexity is not merely about what is being observed, but about the relationship between the observer’s knowledge framework and the observed phenomenon.
Third, at the teleological level, complexity emerges through purpose and intention. When we declare something as ‘complex’, we are not making a purely objective observation. Instead, this declaration typically arises from a specific purpose or intention. This may be tied to the need to manage a situation, the desire to understand a situation, the need to solve a problem or the obligation to make decisions.
This three-tiered analysis demonstrates that the concept of complexity makes most sense when an observer is involved. As Derrida notes in “Of Grammatology” [1]– There is no outside-text. Similarly, there is no complexity outside of our purposeful engagement with situations. The very act of identifying complexity is embedded in our intentions and purposes. Complexity ’emerges’ when we try to understand something, manage something, or achieve something. It is inextricably tied to our purposes and capabilities.
The next point to consider is how différance structures our understanding of complexity. When we identify something as complex, we explain it through emergence. This emergence is further explained through various properties, which in turn point to relationships that lead us back to emergence and complexity. This pattern mirrors Derrida’s différance, where meaning is constantly deferred through a chain of references.
As he notes in “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” [2]:
The center is not the center… the concept of centered structure is in fact the concept of a freeplay based on a fundamental ground, a freeplay constituted upon a fundamental immobility and a reassuring certitude, which is itself beyond the reach of the freeplay.
In his deconstructionist approach, Derrida critiqued the traditional metaphysical idea that meaning or reality is grounded in an immediate, fully present essence—something that can be directly perceived and understood without ambiguity. This notion of “presence” suggests that there is a fundamental truth or meaning that is self-evident and immediately accessible to the mind. However, Derrida challenges this assumption, arguing that meaning is never fully present or directly available. Complexity, in this view, is never completely “present.” It is always understood in relation to other concepts, each of which itself requires further explanation and definition. In this way, complexity can never be reduced to a simple, fixed presence; instead, it is always deferred, dependent on the play of differences and relationships between terms.
Derrida’s concept of différance provides crucial insights into how complexity ‘operates’. In “Margins of Philosophy” [3], he writes:
Différance is what makes the movement of signification possible only if each so-called ‘present’ element… is related to something other than itself, thereby keeping within itself the mark of its past element and already letting itself be vitiated by the mark of its relation to the future element.
Complexity is never purely present. It carries traces of past experiences, and it points toward future implications. In this perspective, complexity exists in a network of relationships. The concept of trace is particularly relevant to understanding complexity. In “Of Grammatology” [1], Derrida explains:
The presence-absence of the trace… carries in itself the problems of the letter and the spirit, of body and soul, and of all the problems whose primary affinity I have recalled.
This suggests that complexity is both present (in our observation) and absent (in its continual deferral). Complexity carries within itself marks of our purposes and intentions. It also contains traces of our past experiences and future expectations. This leads us to a nuanced understanding of complexity as a perspective of possibilities. This is further illuminated by Derrida’s critique of ‘presence’ in “Speech and Phenomena” [4]:
The presence of the perceived present can appear as such only inasmuch as it is continuously compounded with a nonpresence and nonperception, with primary memory and expectation.
Derrida explores the idea that our perception of the present moment is inherently tied to our understanding of time, memory, and anticipation. In other words, we cannot fully experience or recognize the “present” unless it is continuously linked to what is not present—our memory of the past and our expectations for the future. This further supports the view of complexity as being grounded in our capabilities and shaped by our purposes. It is influenced by our past experiences and directed toward future actions.
Final Thoughts
Much like Berkeley’s question of whether a tree falling in the forest will make a sound if there is no one to hear it, I propose that complexity requires an observer. Complexity measures are always knowledge and purpose-relative. This means that different purposes yield different complexities. What is complex to one observer may be merely complicated to another. No absolute measure can exist independent of purpose. Consider the example of a pandemic: there may be objective properties such as transmission rate, virus size, and type, but the notion of complexity makes sense only within the network of relationships, purposes, and meanings. Here, complexity emerges through various needs such as public health management, economic considerations, and social conditions.
As Derrida’s philosophy suggests, complexity exists not as a presence but as a network of relationships, purposes, and meanings. There is no ‘ground’ for complexity as a pure property independent of an observer. This view offers a more nuanced and practical approach to understanding and managing complex situations. This perspective changes how we approach complex challenges, suggesting that effective management requires understanding not just situations, but the purposes, capabilities, and contexts that make them complex in the first place.
Managing complexity within this framework requires understanding the specific purposes of the participants, their capabilities, contextual factors, and available resources. We should appreciate multiple perspectives and not fear provisional solutions. I invite readers to check out this post that goes deeper into Derrida’s deconstruction.
I will conclude with Derrida’s words:
There are things like reflecting pools, and images, an infinite reference from one to the other, but no longer a source, a spring. There is no longer any simple origin. For what is reflected it split in itself and not only as an addition to itself of its image. The reflection, the image, the double, splits what it doubles. The origin of the speculation becomes a difference. What can look at itself is not one; and the law of the addition of the origin to its representation, or the thing to its image, is that one plus one makes at least three.
(Simply put, the above passage suggests that representation or reflection always results in a gap because they are inherently split. This gap creates a difference between the original and its image. As a result, the traditional notion of a stable origin or source is undermined. Instead, meaning emerges through a play of differences. The idea that “one plus one makes at least three” indicates that when an origin is reflected or represented, a third element, the difference or gap between them, emerges. This reveals that neither the original nor its reflection is self-contained or stable.)
Always keep on learning…
[1] Of Grammatology, Derrida. 1967
[2] Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences, Derrida. 1970
[3] Margins of Philosophy, Derrida. 1972
[4] Speech and Phenomena, Derrida. 1967
