In today’s follow-up to last week’s post, I am exploring the concept of mental models and internal representations in the context of sensemaking. The term “mental model” is frequently used in business literature. I am utilizing the ideas of Martin Heidegger and Humberto Maturana to look at this deeper.

The traditional view in cognitive science has been that we construct internal representations or mental models that map external reality, and that this allows us to deal with the complexity thrown at us. Both Heidegger’s and Maturana’s ideas challenge this notion. In their view, rather than us having an internal representation, a copy of the world outside, we interact directly with the world in an embodied and experiential manner.

Heidegger’s view suggests that we are situated in this world within a specific time, space, and culture. We are beings in the world, not detached observers who construct representations to navigate it. Our primary mode of engaging with the world is practical and direct—what Heidegger terms “ready-to-hand.” For instance, consider a carpenter using a hammer. The carpenter does not mentally map the hammer’s properties while working; rather, they engage with it intuitively and fluidly for the task at hand. Representations of the hammer only arise when the hammer fails or is no longer functioning smoothly. At that point, the carpenter steps back and adopts a more reflective stance. Meaning emerges from the carpenter’s direct engagement with the hammer, which is influenced by the context of the task.

Heidegger wrote:

“The less we just stare at the hammer-thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become.”

He elaborated:

“In our dealings, we experience the world not as a collection of objects and properties, but as a network of relations tied to our activity.”

This perspective emphasizes an embodied, experiential approach. Even if we detach ourselves to observe an object, our interaction with it remains experiential. In Heideggerian terms, we skillfully cope with our environment without relying on internal models or representations. The world itself becomes our model through direct engagement. Meaning is not internally calculated and then applied to the world; it emerges from our interaction with it. Our interaction is immediate and practical, not mediated by abstract mental models.

Similarly, Maturana along with Francisco Varela argue that we engage with the world based on our dynamic biological and experiential structures. Our understanding of an object like a hammer arises from past interactions. This experiential knowledge is embodied and emerges through action and interaction. Maturana and Varela reject the idea that our brains passively receive information and build representations of reality. Instead, organisms respond to environmental changes based on their internal structure, which evolves through ongoing interactions with their surroundings. This process does not rely on explicit rules or static patterns, such as in the case of mental models.

Our interpretative framework does not represent the world but operates as a closed system that continuously interacts with and updates based on the world. We respond dynamically to environmental changes, modifying our internal structure as necessary to ensure survival. Like Heidegger, Maturana and Varela emphasize that we bring forth the world through our activity rather than by constructing mental representations. Our experience of the world emerges from our embodied interactions with it.

Heidegger, Maturana and Varela reject the idea of internal representation primarily because they believe it contradicts the concept of an embodied mind. The mind is not independent of the body. They emphasize direct, embodied interaction with the world through the process of living. In fact, living itself is an act of cognition. There is no need for internal representations because meaning arises from our direct involvement in the world.

Perhaps this is one of the main reasons artificial intelligence will fall short of achieving sentience. AI relies on static internal representations and lacks the embodied, experiential living necessary for achieving sentience.

I will conclude with a quote from Maturana and Varela from their wonderful book, Tree of Knowledge:

 “We do not see what is ‘out there,’ but rather we bring forth a world through the process of living.”

Always keep on learning…

Note: Thank you Ivo Velitchkov for the corrections.